From Monachos.net
Notes on this text:
- The Greek text used as the basis of this translation is that of of R.J. Deferrari, beginning on p. 196 of Loeb vol. 190. The | markers in the translation indicate the location of page breaks in the Greek text. Words in square brackets are those inserted for clarity, while those in italics are transliterations of Greek words. The division of the text into sections, along with the section titles, is not found in the Greek text and is the translator's own.
- Scripture links open a new browser window to the NKJV text on biblegateway.com.
Critical Version:
- You may access our critical version of this text in Adobe PDF format. The critical version includes far more precise formatting and page references to the Greek text. It is the version that should be cited in any quotations, and used for printing; and it may be a better display if you are having trouble seeing the Greek.
To Gregory his brother, concerning the distinction between ousia and hypostasis.[1]
Since many, with respect to the divine[1] dogmas, do not distinguish the common element[1] of the ousia from the formula of the hypostasis, they stumble into like conjectures and believe it unnecessary to speak of a distinction between ousia and hypostasis (for some of those who accept such things without investigation are pleased, just as they say 'one ousia', also to say 'one hypostasis'; and vice-versa, those who accept three hypostases, from this confession believe it necessary to assert a division into the same number of ousiai). On account of this, and in order that you may not suffer the same errors, I have composed for you a short memorandum concerning this subject. To put it in brief, then, the meaning of the words is as follows:
The distinction between words of a general and words of a particular meaning, within the context of the model of human nature.
All words predicated of things plural and numerically diverse have a certain more general meaning; for example: 'man'. For saying this, one indicates the general nature by the word and does not, through the term, specify any individual man who is particularly known by the name. For Peter is no more 'man' | than is Andrew, or John or James. The common element[1] of the thing signified, then, encompasses all those things which are included under the same term; therefore it is necessary to have a further mark of clarification[1] through which we may understand, not the general 'man', but Peter or John in particular.
Some words, on the other hand, have a more particular denotation, through which it is not the common element of the nature that is indicated by the term, but the circumscription of a certain thing which has, with respect to its individuality, nothing in common with the larger genus; for example: 'Paul' or 'Timothy'. For no longer does such a term have a bearing upon the generality of the nature, but, cutting [subjects] off from the comprehensive term, it establishes the meaning of certain circumscribed things through their names. Therefore whenever a word is sought for two or more subjects which have the same being,[1] that is, a term [which will indicate] the ousia of these men, for example Paul and Silouan and Timothy, one will not apply a certain formula of ousia to Paul, another to Silouan, and yet another to Timothy; but by whichever formula of ousia Paul is indicated, these terms will also apply to the others. And those subjects which are described by the same formula of ousia are homoousioi with one another. But when a person, having gained knowledge of the common element, turns to the investigation of the individual traits through which one subject is cut off[1] from another, no longer will the term which conveys knowledge of one subject hold together in all respects for the others, even if in certain respects it is found to include the common element.
The notion of the general-particular expanded into the notion of ousia-hypostasis.
| This, then, is what we have to say: that which is particularly denoted is indicated by the word hypostasis. For by saying 'man', one produces in our mind[1] a certain vague concept by means of the indefiniteness of the term, so that although the nature is indicated by the word, the thing subsisting [in that nature] and particularly indicated by the noun, is not made evident. But in saying 'Paul', one makes clear through the use of the word a nature subsisting in a particular pragma.
This, therefore, is the hypostasis: not the indefinite notion of the ousia which, by reason of the generality of the term, discloses no stasis ['sistence']; but rather the notion which, by means of the particular traits that it indicates, establishes and circumscribes in a certain pragma that which is general and uncircumscribed. Such [a notion] is customarily used in Scripture, in this passage and that, and especially in the story of Job. For when he was about to narrate the events concerning his life,[1] he first mentioned the common [term], saying 'man', then immediately specified the particular meaning with the addition of 'a certain'. But he is silent with respect to the description of the ousia, considering it to bear no fruit in the objective set before him. But this 'certain' man | he characterises by those particular attributes which make him known, speaking of the place, those marks which make known his character, and all those external attributes which serve to cut him off and set him apart from the general idea [of man]. As a result, through all these means--the name, the place, the peculiar attributes of his person,[1] his observable external attributes--the description of the subject of the story becomes clear. But if he were giving an account of the ousia, no mention would have been made of the aforesaid things in his explanation of the nature; for the same formula would have been used with respect to Baldad the Sauhite, Sophar the Minnaean, and each of those mentioned there.
Therefore, if you transfer to the divine dogmas the same principle of differentiation which you recognise as applying to ousia and hypostasis in human affairs, you will not go astray. In whatever manner the notion of the Father's being[1] is understood by you (for it is to no avail to press a definite conception upon a spiritual being, because we are persuaded that it is above all conception), thus also will you conceive of the Son, and the same way also of the Holy Spirit. For the principle of uncreatedness and incomprehensibility is one and the same for the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; for one is not more | incomprehensible and uncreated, and another less. But since it is necessary to have an unconfused distinction of the [persons of the] Trinity through the use of individualising terms, those characteristics which are perceived generally, for example I might say 'uncreated' or 'above all comprehension' or other such things, we shall not admit into our discussion of the individual characteristics; rather we shall investigate only those qualities by which the conception of each [person of the Trinity] is sharply and conspicuously marked off from the [three as] examined together.
The three persons of the Trinity and their personal attributes.
Now it seems to me that the best way to follow up our discussion is as follows. Every good thing that comes to us from the divine power, we say is the working of the Grace who works all in all, as the Apostle says: 'One and the same Spirit works all these things, dividing them each as He desires'. Asking, then, whether the supply of blessings takes its source from only the Holy Spirit and thus comes to those who are worthy, again we are led by Scripture to the belief that the Only-begotten God is the source and cause of the supply of blessings that is worked in us through the Holy Spirit. For all things were brought into being by Him and in Him cohere, as we have been taught by holy Scripture. When, therefore, we have been lifted up to this conception, again, being led by divinely inspired guidance, we are taught that through that power all things are | brought into being from not being, but not by that power without beginning: there is a certain power that exists as both unbegotten and without beginning, which is the cause of the cause of all things that exist. For the Son, through whom are all things and with whom the Holy Spirit is always inseparably conceived, is from the Father. For it is not possible to conceive of the Son, unless one has previously been enlightened by the Spirit. Since, then, the Holy Spirit, from whom the whole supply of blessings gushes forth to creation, is united with the Son, He is conceived of inseparably with Him; and He has His being attached to the Father as a cause, from whom He proceeds. And He has this as the distinguishing mark of His hypostatic peculiarity, namely that He is made known after the Son and with Him, and has His hypostasis from the Father.[1]
And the Son, who through Himself and with Himself makes known the Spirit who proceeds from the Father, alone shines forth as the Only-begotten from the unbegotten light, having nothing in common, with respect to His individual characteristics, with the Father or with the Holy Spirit, but alone being made known by the sign noted above. And the God over all alone has a remarkable distinguishing characteristic of His own hypostasis, namely that He is Father and is hypostasised from no other cause; and through this sign again He is recognised individually as Himself. On account of this, we say that there exists in the community of ousia no accord and no community with respect to the distinguishing characteristics beheld of the Trinity, through which is established the individuality of the Persons as | handed down in the faith, each one being apprehended separately by means of their peculiar characteristics; so that through the signs just mentioned, the distinction of the hypostases is discovered. But with respect to those characteristics such as being 'infinite', 'incomprehensible', 'uncreated,' 'uncircumscribed by any space', and all such things, there is no variation among the life-creating nature, I mean between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit; but a certain continuous and uninterrupted community is found among them.
The unity of the Father, Son & Holy Spirit, and the impossibility of their individual conception.
And through whatever thought processes one arrives at the conception of any one of the members of the Holy Trinity in which we believe, through these same processes will he arrive, invariably, at the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit and will see their glory, for there is no interval between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit in which the intellect may stumble and fall. This is so because there is nothing which intrudes itself in the midst of them; nor does there exist any other thing along with the divine nature which might be able to divide it from itself through the insertion of some outside thing; nor is there a void consisting of an interval of no subsistence,[1] which might cause a breaking open of the divine ousia with respect to its own inner harmony by the breaking apart of the continuity through the insertion of this void. But he who has conceived of the Father, and has conceived of Him by Himself, has also received the Son into his mind; and having received the Son, he does not divide the Spirit from the Son, but following in sequence with respect to the order, yet unitedly with respect to the nature, | he forms an image[1] in himself of the faith that is a mixing of the three in the same manner. And if someone mentions the Spirit alone, he has by this very confession received Him of whom the Spirit is. And since the Spirit is of Christ and of God, as Paul says, just as he who grasps onto one end of a chain draws along with it the other end as well, so he who draws the Spirit, as the prophet says, through Him also drags along together the Son and the Father. And if anyone truly grasps hold of the Son, he shall hold him on two sides: the one where He draws together His Father [to Himself], and the other where He draws His own Spirit. For it is not possible that He who always exists in the Father should be cut off from the Father, nor will He who works all things in the Spirit ever be cut off from His own Spirit. In a like manner, he who receives the Father virtually receives along with Him the Son and the Spirit. For it is not possible in any way to conceive of a cutting or separation whereby the Son is conceived of apart from the Father or the Spirit is parted from the Son; but there is apprehended among these [three] a certain ineffable and inconceivable community, together with a differentiation, with neither the distinction of their hypostases destroying the continuity of their nature, nor the community with respect to the ousia dissipating the individuality of their characteristics. Do not be surprised if | we assert that the same thing is both joined and separated, and if we devise--as if speaking in riddles--a strange and paradoxical sort of united separation and disunited union. For unless you are listening to my words contentiously and spitefully, you will be able to discover a similar phenomenon among perceptible things.
The illustration of the rainbow offered as evidence in the perceptible creation of the possibility for 'united separation and disunited union'.
Accept my words as an illustration and a shadow of the truth, and not as themselves the truth of the thing; for it is not possible that an illustration will agree in all respects with that which requires an illustration in order to be explained. Whence, then, do we claim that that which is divided and at the same time united can be analogised through things evident to our senses? Now and then in the spring you have seen in the cloud the lustre of the bow; I mean that bow which, in common speech, is customarily named the 'rainbow'.[1] Those who are skilled in these things claim that [this bow] is formed whenever a certain moisture is mixed with the air, the force of the winds compressing the moist and dense [portions] of the vapours, already having become cloudy, into rain. They say the process of formation is this. When the ray of the sun intercepts at a slant the compact and opaque [portion] of the cloud, then immediately it impresses its own circle upon the cloud such that there is a bending and return of the light to itself, for the sunlight returns in the opposite direction from what is moist and shiny. For since it is in the nature of flame-like | flashes of light, if they fall upon something smooth, to recoil back upon themselves, and since the shape of the sun which is formed in the damp and smooth part of the air is circular, necessarily also is the air adjacent to the cloud outlined in the shape of the sun's disc by the reflecting brilliance. Now this brilliancy is both continuous with itself and separated. For although it is many-coloured and multiform, imperceptibly it is intermingled in itself with the various colours of the dyer, so that the juncture between [the colours] steals unaware from our eyes. As such we cannot discern between the blue-green and the yellow an intervening space which both mingles them together and separates them from each other, or between the yellow and the purple, or between the purple and the amber. For when the rays of all the colours are seen [together], they are distinct yet also hide from us their points of continuity with each other, eluding our scrutiny, with the result that it is impossible to discover just how far the red or the green [portion] of the radiance extends, and from which point it begins no longer to be that which it is observed to be in its distinct segment.
Therefore, just as in this illustration we | distinguish clearly the differences among the colours, yet are not able to perceive by our senses the separation between one colour and another, conclude, I pray, that it is also possible to draw an analogy with respect to the divine dogmas; [namely that] the individual traits of the hypostases, as is evident with each given colour of the rainbow, flash their light upon each of the other members of the Holy Trinity in which we believe. And with respect to the nature of each individual Person, no distinction is perceived between one and the next; but within the community of the ousia the individual characteristics of each one shine forth. For even there in our illustration, there is one ousia which flashes forth the many-coloured ray; [more precisely, there is] one ousia that is bent back through the sunbeam, but the hue of what is seen is many-coloured. Thus even through the creation, reason teaches us not to become uneasy[1] in discussions of dogma when we fall into concepts difficult to understand, or to become dizzy when coming to a conflict of propositions. For just as, with respect to things seen by our eyes, experience seems better than a theory of causation, so also with respect to the transcendent dogmas is faith better than apprehension through reasoning, for faith teaches of that which is separated in hypostasis yet united in ousia. Since, therefore, reason demonstrates a certain common element in the Holy Trinity as well as an element peculiar [to each of its members], the formula of the commonality is | referred to as the ousia, and the hypostasis is the individual note of each.
Discussion of St Paul's reference to the Son as the 'character of the hypostasis' of the Father (Heb 1.3).
But perhaps someone thinks that the doctrine of the hypostasis presented here does not agree with the conception [found] in the writings of the Apostle, in which he says concerning the Lord, that He is 'the effulgence of His glory and the figure of His hypostasis'.[1] For if we have defined hypostasis as the conflux of the traits individual to each [Person], and if one confesses that, just as is the case with the Father, there is some observed particularity through which He alone is made known, so also will he believe likewise with respect to the Only-begotten. How, then, is it that the Scripture witnesses to the term 'hypostasis' for the Father alone, yet calls the Son the 'figure of [His] hypostasis', thus characterising the Son not by the distinguishing characteristics found in Himself, but by those of the Father? For if the hypostasis is the individualising sign of the existence of each, but the trait of unbegottenness is confessed to be peculiar to the Father, and if the Son has been formed by the individual characteristics of the Father, then no longer does it remain to the Father alone to be called 'unbegotten', if indeed the existence of the Only-begotten is characterised by the individual traits of the Father.
But we assert this, namely that the statement fulfils a different purpose for the apostle, toward which | he was looking when he proclaimed these words, saying 'the effulgence of His glory and the figure of His hypostasis'--a purpose which, if a person perceives it properly, he will find does not contradict our statements; but [Paul's] argument is carried out with a certain peculiar intention. For the apostle's doctrine does not work at distinguishing the hypostases from one another through their evident characteristics, but rather at perceiving the true relatedness, the indivisibility, and the unity of the relationship of the Son to the Father. For he does not say 'who is the glory of the Father', even though this is true, but takes it for granted[1] and, teaching us not to conceive of one kind of glory in the Father and another in the Son, he defines the glory of the Only-begotten as the 'effulgence of the glory' of the Father, that the Son will be conceived of inseparably with the Father, making use of the illustration of the light. For just as the ray is from the flame, and the ray is not later than the flame, but at the same moment that the flame is kindled, its light shines forth together with it; thus [the apostle] desires that the Son be considered as from the Father, not that the Only-begotten is separated from the existence of the Father by any extent or interval, but that the cause always be conceived of together with that which proceeds from it.
Therefore in the same manner, as if to explain the notion previously set forth, he says 'and the figure of His hypostasis', leading us by corporeal illustrations to the | comprehension of things invisible. For just as a body exists altogether in form,[1] but the principle of the form is different than that of the body, and no one in giving a definition of the one would join it together with[1] the definition of the other (with the exception that even if conceptually you separate form and body, nature does not admit of the separation, but the one is [always] thought of with the other), thus does the apostle believe it necessary--even though the doctrine of faith teaches the unconfused and distinct separation of the hypostases--to set forth through the words just mentioned the continuity and, as it were, congenital unity between the Only-begotten and the Father. He does not [say this] as if the Only-begotten did not also exist in an hypostasis, but in order that no interspace be admitted into His oneness with the Father, so that he who gazes with the eyes of his soul upon the figure of the Only-begotten, in so doing perceives the hypostasis of the Father, the recognised individuality of each not being transferred or intermixed between them, so that begottenness is falsely ascribed to the Father or unbegottenness to the Son; but that, were it possible to separate the one [person] from the other, alone and by itself the one remaining would be apprehended. For it is not possible, in naming the Son, not to bring to mind the Father, this appellation certainly[1] indicating the Father as well.
| Therefore, since he who has seen the Son sees the Father, just as the Lord says in the Gospels, on this account [the apostle] says that the Only-begotten is the figure of the hypostasis of the Father. And in order that the concept may be more clearly understood, we shall take up other expressions of the apostle, in which he says 'the image of the invisible God'[1] and again 'the image of His goodness',[1] not in order to divide the image from the archetype with respect to the principles of invisibility and goodness, but in order that it may be shown that that [the image] is the same as the prototype, even as it is different. For the principle of the image would not be preserved unless in all respects it retained a manifest and unalterable [likeness]. Accordingly, he who has conceived of the beauty of the image is also aware of the archetype. And he who receives into his mind the form, as it were, of the Son, forms an image also of the figure of the hypostasis of the Father, seeing the latter through the former--not seeing the unbegottenness of the Father in the copy (for then [the Son] would be in every way the same [as the Father] and not different), but discerning the unbegotten beauty in the begotten. For just as one, having perceived the reflection of the shape of the thing that is reflected in a bright mirror,[1] has a vivid knowledge of the face represented [there], thus he who recognises the Son, through his knowledge of the Son, receives into his heart the | figure of the Father's hypostasis. For all the attributes of the Father are beheld in the Son, and all the attributes of the Son are in the Father, inasmuch as the Son wholly abides in the Father and, in turn, has the Father wholly in Himself. Thus the hypostasis of the Son is, as it were, the form and character of the knowledge of the Father; and the hypostasis of the Father is made known in the form of the Son, their observed individuality remaining among them as a clear distinction between their hypostases.